Many cities have seen public support for congestion charges increase substantially after charges have been introduced. Several alternative explanations of this phenomenon have been suggested, but so far little evidence has been available to assess the relative importance of these explanations. We study attitudes to congestion pricing in Gothenburg before and after congestion charges were introduced in January 2013. Attitudes to the charges did indeed become more positive after the introduction, just as in previous cities. Using a two-wave postal survey, we are able to separate contributions to the attitude change from a number of sources: benefits and costs being different than anticipated, use of hypothecated revenues, reframing processes, and changes in related attitudes such as attitudes to environment, equity, taxation and pricing measures in general. We conclude that the dominant reason for the attitude change is status quo bias, rather than any substantial changes in beliefs or related attitudes, although some of these factors also contribute to some extent. Contrary to a common belief, nothing of the attitude change is due to benefits being larger than anticipated.
INTRODUCTION
The main obstacle for introducing congestion pricing is often public resistance. However, several cities have reported that public support for congestion pricing has increased substantially after a congestion pricing system has been introduced (e.g. London (Schade & Baum, 2007) , Stockholm (Eliasson & Jonsson, 2011; Eliasson, 2014) ; Trondheim, Bergen and Oslo in Norway (Tretvik, 2003) ; United States (Zmud (2008) quoted in Anas and Lindsey (2011) ); Milan (Ozer, Beria, & Pacchi, 2012) ; there is also some evidence for the phenomenon in Singapore (Gopinath Menon & Kian-Keong, 2004) ). Several explanations for this phenomenon have been hypothesized, but so far there has been little conclusive evidence as to which of the potential explanations are the most important. The suggested explanations are not mutually exclusive, and they may all contribute to some extent. The purpose of this paper is to determine their relative importance in a specific case, namely the introduction of congestion pricing in January 2013 in Gothenburg, Sweden's second largest city. Just as in the cases cited above, public attitudes in Gothenburg did indeed become substantially more positive after the introduction.
Based on an extensive before/after survey of public attitudes, we estimate models where respondents' attitudes to congestion charges are explained by variables such as expected toll payments, value of time, socioeconomic factors, beliefs about effects, and attitudes to related issues such as environment, equity, taxation, government and pricing policies in general. By comparing models and variables before and after the introduction, the contribution of each variable to the attitude change can be determined. As a side result, we can also identify which groups have changed their attitude. To our knowledge, this is the first survey of its kind.
In the public debate, the most common explanation of the increased public support after introduction is that benefits turn out to be larger than anticipated. But several other mechanisms have been hypothesized, such as hypothecation of revenues, changes in related attitudes, reframing, and various forms of status quo bias. We test seven hypotheses that may explain the increased public support, which have all been suggested in public debate or the scientific literature: (H1) Larger benefits than expected. The support for charges after introduction may increase because benefits such as reduced congestion and improved urban environment turn out to be larger than expected. This is by far the most common explanation, put forward for example in a prescient paper by Goodwin (2006) . (H2) Smaller downsides than expected. Several authors have pointed out that adverse effects tend to be exaggerated before the introduction, and that resistance may decrease after introduction if problems such as increased public transport crowding and decreased inner-city retail turn out to be less serious than anticipated. In addition, adapting to the charges may seem more costly beforehand than it actually turns out to be (Eliasson, 2008 (Eliasson, , 2014 Henriksson, 2009 ). (H3) Benefits of accompanying measures. Introduction of congestion charges is often accompanied by improvements in the transport system, for example in alternative modes or routes. These improvements are often paid for by (hypothecated) charge revenues, or at least marketed as part of a charges/infrastructure package. An increased satisfaction with for example the public transport system might spill over to an increased support for the charges. Several authors have argued that a "package approach" with accompanying measures is key for achieving acceptance for congestion pricing (Gopinath Menon & Kian-Keong, 2004; Jones, 1991) . (H4) Changes in related attitudes. Attitudes to congestion charges tend to be influenced by other related attitudes and values, such as environmental concerns, concerns for social equity, trust in government, and acceptability of general pricing principles such as user pricing, polluter pricing and scarcity pricing (Eliasson & Jonsson, 2011; Frey, 2003; Raux & Souche, 2004) . The debates and campaigns surrounding the introduction of congestion charges may affect these other attitudes, which may then influence the attitude to congestion charges as a second-order effect. For example, it has been suggested that part of the increased support in Stockholm was caused by an increased acceptance for pricing policies in general (Börjesson, Eliasson, Hugosson, & Brundell-Freij, 2012 ). (H5) Reframing. The strength with which various attitudes and values are associated with, and hence influence, the attitude to congestion charges may change over time, in particular if congestion charges are reframed, i.e. interpreted or marketed in a different way. For example, if congestion pricing is reframed from a fiscal policy to an environmental policy, it would be expected that the influence of self-interest and attitudes to taxation becomes relatively weaker compared to the influence of environmental concerns. How policies are framed often has a crucial effect on public support; Heberlein (2012) provides several examples. (H6) Loss aversion. It is well established that losses are valued proportionally higher than gains in situations where there is a clear point of reference (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) . Hence, one might expect that increases in travel costs are valued higher before congestion pricing is introduced than afterwards, and improved travel times are valued higher after the introduction than before. Both phenomena would imply that car drivers would become more positive after the introduction than before. Note that this is different from benefits being larger (1) or adverse effects smaller (2) than expected; loss aversion refers to the phenomenon when effects are valued differently after a change, even when their objective size is undisputed. (H7) Status quo bias. Status quo bias refers to situations when preferences for a policy are asymmetric -lower beforehand than afterwards. It may be caused by loss aversion, but can also be caused by cognitive dissonance (resistance tends to decrease if a change seems inescapable beforehand or irreversible afterwards) or resistance to changes as such, regardless of tangible losses or gains. Status quo bias of various kinds have been suggested to be one contributing factor to the increased support once congestion pricing is introduced (Brundell-Freij, Jonsson, & Källström, 2009; Eliasson, 2014) or seems inevitable (Schade & Baum, 2007) .
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the story of the Gothenburg congestion charges, and section 3 describes the survey data collection. The attitude to the congestion charges was measured as the stated voting intention in a referendum about the congestion charges, on a 5-grade scale from "most likely yes" to "most likely no". The survey also measured respondents' attitudes to a large number of potentially related issues, such as environment, social equity, taxes and the fairness of pricing in different contexts.
Section 4 describes the changes in attitudes and beliefs. We show that the attitude to the charges did indeed become more positive, and by describing the changes in beliefs and potentially related attitudes, we get a first indication of whether such changes may have contributed to the more positive attitude to the charges (mechanisms H1-H4).
In section 5, we estimate econometric models where respondents' attitudes to congestion charges are explained by their beliefs about the effects, how they are affected by the charges (for example how much tolls they pay or expect to pay), and potentially related attitudes (e.g. environmental concerns). Using factor analysis, we first identify how a number of attitude questions in the survey can be combined into four more general attitude factors, and these are then included in the econometric models. Through the models, we can measure how much changes in attitudes and beliefs contribute to the change in the attitude to the charges, and hence test H1-H4. By comparing models before and after the introduction of the charges, we can test H5-H7. If reframing contributes to the attitude change (H4), the association between the congestion charging attitude and one or several of the attitude factors should change. If loss aversion contributes to the change (H6), then toll payments or time savings should be valued differently before and after the introduction, and hence affect the congestion charge attitude differently. We attribute the remaining, "inexplicable" change in attitudes to the charges to status quo bias (H7); we develop our arguments for this interpretation further on. Section 7 concludes.
In summary, we conclude that status quo bias (H7) is the main contributing factor to the increased support in Gothenburg, with minor contributions from H2-H4. Contrary to what is often assumed, "larger benefits than expected" (H1) does not play any role for the change in support. In fact, beliefs in positive effects decreased after the introduction, but support for the charges increased in spite of this.
THE GOTHENBURG CONGESTION CHARGES
The Gothenburg congestion charges have two purposes: revenue generation and congestion reduction. The background is that Stockholm, the capital of Sweden and the largest city in the country, introduced congestion charges in 2006. This decision was initially met with fierce public resistance, but public opinion started to shift in favour of the congestion charges soon after the introduction. In a referendum nine months after the introduction, a majority voted in favour of keeping the charges. After the referendum, the national government struck a deal with Stockholm that revenues from the congestion charges would be used to co-finance a major infrastructure package, where the charge revenue was leveraged with national funding. This was a paradigm shift in Swedish infrastructure funding; normally, investments in the national road and rail systems are funded by national grants.
The way in which Stockholm used revenues from congestion charges to, as it appeared, unlock substantial national funding served as a direct inspiration for Gothenburg politicians. Soon they were negotiating a similar package with the national government, where the plan was to introduce congestion pricing in Gothenburg and leverage the revenues with national funding to fund a large infrastructure package. Half of the package would be financed with national funds and half with regional funds, of which the majority would come from future congestion pricing revenues (a minor part was to be financed directly from the regional municipal budgets, which are funded by income taxation). The agreement was presented in 2009, preceded by virtually no public debate. All political parties in Gothenburg were in favour of the agreement. However, there was considerable public opposition, in particular against the congestion charges, which among other things led to the formation of a new political party campaigning against the charges ("Vägvalet", a pun roughly meaning "crossroads" or "choose the road").
The Gothenburg congestion charges hence have the dual purpose to generate revenues for the infrastructure package and reduce road congestion. The deal prescribed that the system had to generate around 1 billion SEK per year, a third more than the Stockholm revenues despite Gothenburg being less than half the size of Stockholm. The secondary design objective was to achieve as efficient congestion reduction as possible, given the revenue constraint. However, Gothenburg did not have a lot of road congestion; congestion was limited to a few junctions and the morning rush hour.
The scheme consists of a cordon with two additional tolling borders sprouting out from the cordon (Figure 1 ). Charges are levied 6:00-18:30 on weekdays, and range from 8 SEK to 18 SEK depending on the time of day. Vehicles are charged when they cross a toll border in any direction, but only have to pay one charge during any one-hour period. Börjesson and Kristoffersson (2014) show that traffic across the toll cordon was reduced by 12%, and that average congestion indices on the few congested links were reduced from 160% to 80% (although most affected links were not congested even before).
Figure 1. Gothenburg with toll borders in red, and charge levels per time period.
Almost immediately, opponents to the charges argued that there ought to be a referendum about the charges, just as in Stockholm. In the autumn of 2013, it was decided to hold such a referendum in the autumn of 2014.
DATA COLLECTION
The analysis in this paper is based on two postal surveys conducted in Gothenburg before and after the introduction of congestion charges in January 2013. The first wave took place in November 2012 and the second wave in November 2013. The survey is an adaptation of a survey first developed and used in a Swedish-French-Finnish study Souche et al., 2014) . The surveys were sent to random samples The samples are independent, i.e. this is not a panel study; disadvantages such as attrition, self-selection and anchoring were judged to be larger than potential advantages of a panel study.
Respondents were asked "In a referendum about the congestion charges and the related infrastructure package, how would you vote?" with answers on a five-grade scale from "Definitely yes" to "Definitely no" with "Don't know" as the middle option.
The question was about both the congestion charges and the infrastructure, since they are intimately linked to each other; without congestion pricing, the infrastructure package is unlikely, and the other way around. At the time of the first wave (November 2012), a referendum was discussed but no decision had been made. At the time of the second wave (November 2013), it had recently been decided to hold a referendum in September 2014. Hence, the question was not a hypothetical issue.
In order to reduce strategic responses and reverse causality between the general attitudes and the attitude to congestion charges, the survey was not presented as a survey about congestion charges, but a survey about attitudes to traffic and various social issues in general. Respondents were presented with statements such as "Taxes are too high" and "Much more resources should be spent on protecting the environment", and asked to what extent they agreed on a 7-grade scale, from "completely disagree" (1) over "neutral" (4) to "completely agree" (7)". Some of the statements concerned social and political issues that might be associated with congestion pricing, such as environment, taxation and social equity. Some of them concerned acceptability for pricing mechanisms in other contexts, such as differentiated air fares and taxing noise and emissions. The formulations were designed to avoid an explicit connection between the various social issues (environment, equity, taxes etc.) and the congestion charges, to reduce the risk of reverse causality.
Respondents' support for congestion charges can be expected to be related to their valuation of travel time savings. As an indicator of the value of time, respondents were asked to imagine the following situation:
You commute daily by car. On the way, you have to cross a bridge across a river. One day the bridge closes for repairs for some time. Another bridge is available further downstream, but the detour takes an additional 20 minutes. During the time the bridge is repaired, the road authority has arranged a ferry that can take cars across the river. What is the highest amount you would be prepared to pay for a one-way ferry ticket, to save 20 minutes on your journey to work?
Such a question only gives a rough indication of respondents' actual valuation of travel time savings -its purpose is only to enable us to explore the relation between respondents' value of time and their support for congestion charging. However, the resulting value of time distribution turned out to be close to what real value of time studies have found (e.g. (Börjesson & Eliasson, 2014) ).
Respondents' attitude to congestion charges can also be expected to be related to perceived fairness of various possible allocation mechanisms. To measure this, the question continued:
Some people complain to the authority that it is unfair that the authority charges a price for the ferry tickets. When offering the ferry for free, it turns out that there is not room on the ferry for everyone who wants to use it. The authority now considers four different methods to choose who gets to travel with the ferry. To what extent do you consider these alternatives fair?
-Price: Revert to the original policy of charging those who want to travel, and set the price so the ferry is just filled. -Queue: Those who arrive first to the jetty and stand first in line get to go with the ferry. -Authority determines "need": Those who want to travel with the ferry have to show some evidence to support their need. The authority then provides ferry passes based on their judgment of the greatest need. -Lottery: Tickets are allocated randomly, so that everybody has an equal chance of winning. -Rationing: The number of ferry trips per person is limited to three trips per week.
Respondents were asked to rate the fairness of each allocation mechanism on a 7-grade scale, from "Completely unfair" to "Completely fair".
CHANGES IN ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS
This section describes the changes in attitudes to the congestion charges, beliefs in their effects, and attitudes to some potentially related issues changed from immediately before the introduction of the charges to one year afterwards. In section 4.1, we show that attitudes to the charges did indeed become more positive. In section 4.2 and 4.3, we describe changes in beliefs and potentially related attitudes, thereby getting a first indication of whether such changes may have contributed to the more positive attitude to the charges (mechanisms H1-H4).
Changes in attitudes to the congestion charges
In our before/after survey, respondents were asked how they would vote in a referendum about the congestion charges and the associated infrastructure package 1 . Results are presented in Table 1 . 
Almost a year after the introduction, public opinion had become much more positive.
Excluding "don't know", the share of positive respondents had increased from 33% to 50%. Moreover, the positive respondents were more convinced while the negative respondents were less convinced on average: the share of yes-voters that would "definitely" vote yes had increase from a third to a half, while the share of no-voters that would "definitely" vote no had decreased from three fifths to half.
As a comparison, the National Transport Administration has conducted repeated surveys the attitudes to the congestion charges and the infrastructure package in Gothenburg. That survey is not directly comparable with ours for two reasons. First, the Transport Administration's survey covers the larger Gothenburg region, whereas our survey only includes the city of Gothenburg; second, the Transport Administration's survey asks the respondents to state their opinion about the congestion charges only, whereas our survey asks about the opinion about the package of charges and infrastructure investment. Results are shown in Figure 2 . For our purposes in this paper, the important point is that the change over time in the two surveys is similar.
Figure 2. Public support for the congestion pricing/infrastructure package; share of respondents who state that they would vote in favour of the package in a referendum, excluding "don't know/wouldn't vote" responses. Note that congestion charges were introduced in January 2013.
In September 2014, a referendum was held regarding the congestion charges, where 57% voted against the charges. This is at first difficult to reconcile with the figures above. However, as shown in Börjesson and Kristoffersson (2014) , the referendum result is explained by an increasingly negative opinion to the railway tunnel for which the congestion charging revenues is supposed to be used. Around the time of the referendum, polls show the perhaps unexpected situation that the voters in the municipality of Gothenburg, where the referendum was held, were positive to the congestion charging system (57% positive), but negative to the railway tunnel (60% negative). Hence, the negative outcome of the referendum was more an effect of the negative publicity surrounding the railway tunnel than the resistance to congestion charges. After the referendum, the Gothenburg politicians decided to keep the congestion charges anyway, since the decision to build the railway tunnel remained (it was not formally a part of the referendum) and there was no other way to fund the tunnel.
Changes in beliefs about the effects
In the surveys, respondents were asked about their beliefs regarding the effects of the charges, before and after the introduction. The survey presented a number of variables, such as congestion and public transport crowding, and asked respondents how they thought the charges would influence (or had influenced, after the introduction) these variables, on a 7-grade scale from "Large decrease" to "Large increase". Results are presented in Table 2 , showing the share of respondents that believed that charges would affect/had affected the variable in the expected way. Crowding in public transport will increase/has increased 2 (negative effect)
79% 61%
Retail within the cordon will decrease/has decreased 3 (negative effect)
54% 42%
The quality of life for residents within the cordon will/has…
Before the introduction, 61% believed that car trips to and from the city centre would decrease, although only 47% thought that this would lead to less car queues. After the introduction, the number of people believing that car trips had decreased actually decreased compared to before the introduction; on the other hand, the number believing in congestion reductions remained roughly the same. Turning to less tangible effects, 41% believed that the general quality of life would improve for residents within the cordon, while 17% believed that it would deteriorate. After the introduction, slightly fewer believed in increased quality of life, while the number believing in deterioration remained the same. In summary, the share of respondents believing in positive effects did not increase -in fact, the belief in positive effects actually decreased somewhat. This contradicts (H1), that increased beliefs in beneficial effects is a contributing factor.
However, the share of respondents believing in negative effects decreased compared to before the introduction. The share of people believing in increased public transport crowding sank from 79% to 61%, while the share believing in negative retail effects decreased from 54% to 42%. This lends some support to (H2), that decreased beliefs in negative effects is a contributing factor.
Reverse causality between attitudes and beliefs
However, it is far from evident that it is the change in beliefs that drives the change in attitude to the charges. This is because expressing beliefs in positive or negative effects can to some extent be a way to rationalize one's attitude towards congestion charges. For example, self-interest may cause a negative attitude to congestion charges among car drivers, and these may then rationalize this attitude by expressing disbelief in positive effects. Similarly, respondents who are negative to car traffic for environmental reasons may be positive to increasing the cost of driving, and may partly rationalize this through expressing belief in many sorts of positive effects. This is a well-established psychological mechanism in many contexts. We will show two indications that it is at work in our study as well. Figure 3 suggests that self-interest influence beliefs. The more car trips respondents make, the more they believe that congestion charges will affect inner-city retail negatively, and the less they believe that congestion will be reduced. (The y-axis is the average response on a 4-grade scale from "No effect" (0) to "Large decrease" (3).) Note that beliefs in the negative effect, reduced retail, decrease from 2012 to 2013 across all groups, while beliefs in the positive effect, reduced congestion, remain stable.
Figure 3. Self-interest influences beliefs: Beliefs in effects of the charges, with respect to how often respondents drive across the cordon.
Figure 4 suggests that attitudes also influence beliefs. The stronger environmental concerns respondents have, the more they believe in positive effects on congestion, and the less they believe in negative effects on inner-city retail. Since environmental concerns are strongly correlated with positive attitudes to congestion charges (which will be shown below, confirming several other studies), this suggests that respondents who are positive to congestion charges for environmental reasons are more prone to believe in other kinds of positive effects as well, and less prone to believe in downsides. Again, it is worth noting that beliefs in the negative effect decrease from 2012 to 2013 across all groups, while beliefs in the positive effect remain stable.
Figure 4. Attitudes influence beliefs: Belief in effects of the charges, with respect to how respondents agree with "Much more resources should be spent on protecting the environment".
From the above, it would seem that beliefs are more strongly influenced by attitudes and self-interest the less knowledge respondents have. Few if any respondents actually have information of effects on inner-city retail, since no studies of such effects were published. Beliefs hence have to be founded on hearsay and gut feeling, which likely makes them more prone be influenced by attitudes -one believes what one hopes to be true, essentially. Congestion, on the other hand, were measured and published, it is visible to the naked eye, and many have direct experience of it, or hear from friends. The influence from attitudes and self-interest on beliefs about public transport crowding (not shown here) is even smaller. This is consistent with many results in social psychology where the effect of attitudes on beliefs gest stronger the less experience or knowledge individuals have (see Heberlein (2012) for a summary and discussion).
Changes in attitudes to related issues
The surveys measured attitudes to a number of issues, hypothesized to be related to the attitude to congestion charge, by presenting respondents with statements and asking whether they agreed or disagreed on a 7-grade scale from "completely disagree" (1) over "neutral" (4) to "completely agree" (7)". Results for the two years are presented in Table 3 , showing the mean response on the 7-grade scale. The table also shows the correlations with respondents' voting intention in the congestion charging referendum. Positive correlations indicate that agreeing with the statements is correlated with being positive to congestion charges, and vice versa. Finally, the table shows the responses to the "ferry question" (see section 3), where different ways to allocate scarce space on a ferry were rated with respect to fairness. Most attitudes are stable across the years. Only four changes are significantly different, marked with * in the table (t-statistics for the difference between years are in the next column). In 2013, less respondents agree with the statements "charges and taxes to own, park and drive a car are too high" and "taxes are too high". In addition, more respondents regard pricing the ferry as "fair". From the correlation coefficients, we see that all four attitude changes will be associated with higher support for the charges.
This lends some support to (H4), that the debate about congestion charges affects related attitudes, which causes a second-order effect on the support for the charges. However, it should be emphasized that these attitude changes are not necessarily caused by the introduction of the charges. Several opinion polls noted an increase in voting support for the left/green political block during the measurement period, and higher support for taxation and high driving costs is perfectly consistent with this general political trend. It may hence be that during this time period, there was a general political trend to the left, and this happened to work in favour of the charges.
The fourth attitude change is that more respondents are satisfied with public transport. This is likely related to the extensive public transport improvements and marketing campaigns shortly before and after the introduction of the charges. This change will tend to increase the support for the charges, lending support to (H3), that introducing complementary measures increases support for the charges.
DETERMINANTS OF CONGESTION PRICING ATTITUDES
To explore the determinants of attitudes to the congestion charges, and to what extent different explanatory variables have influenced the change in these attitudes between the years, we estimate ordered logit models. The dependent variable is the response to the voting question described in Section 4, where respondents were asked how they would vote in a referendum about the congestion charges and the associated infrastructure package. Answers were indicated on a 5-grade scale, from "Definitely yes" to "Definitely no", where "Don't know" is the middle category.
The explanatory variables are of three types: socioeconomic variables, variables relating to self-interest (such as amount of tolls paid and the number of cars in the household) and attitudes to potentially related issues (such as environment and equity). In section 5.1, we use factor analysis to identify four fundamental attitude factors from the responses to the statements concerning social and political issues described in Section 3. These attitude factors are then used in the subsequent estimation in section 5.2. In section 5.3, we use the estimated models to calculate the contribution of all explanatory variables to the change in congestion pricing attitudes.
Identification of attitude factors
As described in Section 3, the surveys contained a large number of attitude questions, mainly relating to social equity, environmental concern, taxation, traffic problems, and pricing policies. The questions are formulated as statements, to which respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed on a 7-grade scale. 4 Factor analysis is used to reduce the dimensionality of the responses to these questions down to a smaller number of attitude factors. The factors are determined by identifying how the responses to the questions are correlated. Factor analysis is only justified as long as the factors are interpretable. We believe that the factor analysis resulted in four interpretable factors, described below, and can be thought of as latent fundamental attitudes. Moreover, the same factors were obtained in the 2012 and 2013 samples when estimated separately. The factors are hence also stable across years.
The factor analysis was performed using SPSS. We applied a principal component analysis (PCA) with VARIMAX rotation, resulting in four factors. 5 Table 4 shows the resulting rotated factor loadings, measuring the correlation between the responses to each statement and the factors. Only factor loading 0.4 or larger are displayed and used in the interpretation. A positive number in a column sign indicates that agreeing with the statement contributes positively to the corresponding factor, and a negative number that disagreeing with the statement contributes positively. The first factor, Pricing Acceptance (PRICE), combines statements expressing that pricing is a fair or reasonable way to allocate scarce resources or regulate externalities. The second factor, Tax Resistance (TAX), combines statements expressing that both taxes and car levies are too high, and disagreeing with the notion that car traffic is a big environmental problem. The third factor, Equity Concerns (EQUI), combines concerns for equity and seeing governmental decisions as a fair allocation mechanism. The fourth factor, Environmental Concerns (ENV), combines environmental concerns, support for measures that can be interpreted as traffic restraints (speed cameras, pricing the car ferry) and concerns for equity.
Based in the factor analysis, a factor index is computed for each respondent and factor. It is computed as the average of the responses to the statement included in each factor (this is the statements having non-zero elements in Table 4 ). (For further description of the factors indices see (IBM Corp., 2012)) The indices thus show to what extent the individuals agree with the statements included in each factor (on the 7-grade scale from "completely disagree" (1) over "neutral" (4) to "completely agree" (7)"). The indices can be interpreted as observations of a latent variable reflecting a fundamental value. The factor indices will be used in the subsequent estimation of determinants of attitudes to congestion pricing.
The bottom rows of Table 4 show average factor indices for each year. They remain broadly unchanged, which is natural since very few of the underlying attitudes change significantly (see Table 3 ). There is, however, a significant tendency of declining tax resistance and increasing equity concerns, which is consistent with the general political trend in favour of the left/green political block noted above. "Considerably more resources should be used to protect the environment." 0.646 "Automatic speed cameras is a reasonable way to improve traffic safety" 0.657 "Road congestion is one of Gothenburg's largest problems" 0.564 "Motor traffic is among the largest threats to the environment." -0.356 0.669 "Charges and taxes to own, park and drive a car are too high" 0.821 "Taxes are too high" 0.878 "It is reasonable that airplane tickets cost more for departure during peak hours than during off-peak" 0.777 "It is reasonable that charter operators raise their prices when the Swedish weather is bad." 0.785 "The government should prioritise reducing differences between low-and high-income groups." 0.468 0.465
Pricing the ferry is a fair allocation mechanism. 0.392 0.468 Letting a government agency decide who get to use the ferry is a fair allocation mechanism. 0.714
Would become more positive to congestion charges if the charge was lower for low-income drivers 0.716 
Estimation of explanatory factors of congestion pricing attitudes
Next, we estimate ordered logit models to identify how variables affect the attitude to the congestion charges. Estimations are done in Biogeme (Bierlaire, 2003 (Bierlaire, , 2008 . 
Model formulation
 are usually called threshold parameters. Assuming that the error term  is logistically distributed, the probability of i y is
A more comprehensive description of ordered models can be found in Greene (2003) .
Model results
Estimation results are presented in Table 5 . In Model 1 the independent variables include socioeconomic variables, the attitude factors (described in Section 5.1), variables related to self-interest, satisfaction with the public transport system and belief in positive and negative effects. Since public transport satisfaction and beliefs in effects may be influenced by the congestion charge attitude, rather than the other way around, Model 2 is estimated without these variables (but is otherwise identical to Model 1). None of the other parameters differ significantly between Model 1 and Model 2.
We find, perhaps surprisingly, no evidence that variables affect congestion pricing attitude differently before compared to after the referendum. This was tested by estimating three models, one on the 2012 sample, one on the 2013 sample, and one model on the pooled sample with identical parameters in the two years, except for three year-specific constants (see below). A test of parameter restriction was then used to test whether the null hypothesis that the parameters of the two year-specific models were actually identical. This hypothesis is rejected if the significance probability of the statistic is small; .05 is a commonly used value. The significance probabilities were .14 for Model 1 and .25 for Model 2, so the hypotheses could not be rejected, and we conclude that the variables do in fact seem to affect the congestion pricing attitude in the same way in the two years. We also tested specifically whether the parameters for the four attitude factors were different between the years (keeping the rest of the parameters constant across years), and again we could not reject the hypothesis that the parameters stayed constant across the two years.
Income is a categorical variable with five levels, and coded as a continuous variable using interval midpoints. >3 years university education is a dummy variable taking the value one if the respondent has a university education longer than 3 years. Highest education has three levels reflecting highest education (0=High school, 1=College, 2=University education). Education, high income and being male all tend to increase support for the charges.
The dummy variables Company car and Car in the household take the value one if the respondent has a company car and at least one car in the household, respectively. Cars in the household is a linear variable equalling the number of cars in the household minus one (ranging from 0-2). This variable is smaller for men in 2013, for whom the positive parameter for Cars in the household Male 2013 should be added to obtain the net impact of this parameter. The support for the charges decreases with number of cars in the household. Access to a company car increases support, which is logical since company cars are exempt from the charges. 7
Toll Payer is a dummy variable taking the value one if the respondents pay the toll at least once a month. 8 Toll payments per month is the stated number of trips per month across the cordon per month above 3, on a 3 level scale: 0, 7 and 17. The Value of travel time ranges from 0 to 18 €/h on a seven level scale. This variable is implemented as piece-wise linear variable with kinks as 3 and 15 €/h. Higher value of time and lower toll payments increases the support congestion pricing.
Public transport frequency and Bicycle frequency are coded as number of trips per month on a 4 level scale, 0, 3, 10 and 20. Higher public transport and bicycle trip frequencies increase the support for the charges, although the models already control for toll payments and car ownership. Presumably, high cycling and public transport frequencies indicate high accessibility and comfort by other travel modes than car.
High indices on the attitude factors PRICE (accepting pricing policies in general) and ENVI (environmental concerns, support public interventions, equity concerns) tend to increase support for the charges, as expected. A high index on TAX (taxes in general and on cars in particular are too high, traffic is not a big environmental problem) has a strong negative effect on the attitude to the charges, also as expected. The index of the fourth factor, EQUI (equity concerns, positive view of governmental allocation), does not significantly influence the attitude to the charges.
We may thus conclude that the support for the charges is influenced by self-interestmeasured by variables such as toll payments, value of time and car ownership -and by attitudes to associated issues, such as equity, environment, taxation and trust in the government. Attitudes to associated issues have a substantially higher influence on the support for congestion charges than self-interest. Taken on their own, the attitude factors can explain 79% of the explanatory power of the full model, while the selfinterest variables on their own can only explain 54% of the explained variation in the full model. Once attitudes and self-interest variables are included in the model, socioeconomic variables account for almost nothing -0.2% of the explained variation in the full model. 9
Finally, beliefs in positive and negative effects, respectively, tend to influence attitude to the charges in the expected directions. Two of the beliefs factors, increased public transport crowding and decreased traffic, were not significant. As pointed out earlier, the causality between these beliefs and the attitude towards the charges most likely runs in both directions, so there is clearly a risk for reverse causality in this model. Since there are significant year-specific constants, we can conclude that the entire change in attitudes between the years cannot be explained by changes in the variables alone, neither by changes in attitudes nor any other variables. This is a sign of status quo bias (H7). The year-specific constant is only significant for women, indicating that the support for the charges not explained by the controls has increased among women but not among men. Men in households with at least one car, however, have become less negative compared to 2012. Apart from these differences, the year-specific constants do not depend on socioeconomic characteristics, travel behaviour or toll payments.
Calculation of factors' contribution to attitude changes
The next step in our analysis is to calculate the approximate contribution of the variables in Model 2 to the change in the support for congestion charges. First, a model with only socioeconomic and self-interest variables plus year-specific constants for 2031 is estimated. Then the year-specific constants are set to zero; this gives the predicted support for the charges in 2013, if only changes in socioeconomic and selfinterest variables are taken into account. We then continue by adding more and more variables to the model, which allows us to separate the contributions of the variables from each other. The models predict support on a 5-grade scale; to make results easier to interpret, we summarise this in two different ways (the rightmost columns): the share of yes-voters excluding "don't know" votes, and a "support index" where votes are converted into the figures 1-5. Results are shown in Table 6 . 10 10 To estimate the contribution from different variables we have also used and alternative method: We calculate the average latent variable for 2012, u 2012= βx 2012 , where x 2012 is the population averages in the 2012 sample and the average latent variable for 2013, u 2013= βx 2013 , where x 2012 is the population averages in the 2013 (including the year-specific variables, which captures the "unexplained" change in attitudes). The difference u 2013 -u 2012 is a measure of the total attitude change in the population. To estimate the contribution from each type of variable, we replace the 2012 population averages with the 2013 population averages for one group of The stated support increased from 33% in favour 2013 to 50% in favour 2013. The model with only self-interest and socioeconomic variables (A) actually predicts a slight drop in the support 2013, so apparently changes in self-interest and socioeconomics do not contribute to the increased support. This is in fact evident already from the fact that these variables remain virtually unchanged between the years.
The change in attitude factors (B) explains 26% of the increase in support (4 of 17 percentage points, or a .13 change in the support index out of a total change of .5; it turns out not to matter which summary measure is used). This lends some support to hypothesis (4) above, that changes in related attitudes may cause a second-order effect on the attitude to the charges. As shown earlier, the main attitude differences between the years are increased concerns for equity in society and reduced concerns for high taxes and costs of car use and ownership (see t-tests in Table 4 ). As was also pointed out earlier, these attitude changes are probably not caused by the introduction of the charges or the surrounding debate and political campaigns. During the period between the two surveys, the left/green political block increased its voter support, and this is certainly consistent with the shift in political attitudes seen here. Hence, it seems likely that some of the shift in attitudes seen in our survey is an unrelated trend that just happens to increase support for the charges, rather than being directly caused by the introduction of the charges. 11
The increase in public transport (C) explains virtually nothing of the increased support for the charges -0.7% of the change in support, and 4% of the change in the support index.
The change in beliefs about effects explains 12% of the increase in support. Remember that this is likely to be subject to reverse causality at least to some extent.
variables at a time. Using this method, we arrive at the same conclusion as the using the simulation method explained in Table 6 , but we do not present it here because since the threshold parameters in the ordered logit model influence to what extent an increase in the latent variable changes the dependent variable. 11 That more respondents now view pricing a ferry as a fair allocation mechanism may be due to the introduction of the charges, however.
Most of the attitude change (75%), however, remains unexplained and is captured in the year-specific constant. Three quarters (75%) of the increased support for the charges can be attributed to status quo bias (H7), since it is unexplained by any other variable.
Conclusions: What explains the attitude change?
With the results above, we are now in a position to determine the contributions from our potential mechanisms H1-H7.
(H1) Larger benefits than expected. This mechanism was rejected already in section 4.2, since beliefs in positive effects from the charges actually decreased. (H2) Smaller downsides than expected. This may have had some effect, although there is almost some reverse causality here. The analysis in 5.3 indicates that this mechanisms may have contributed to around X% of the total change in attitudes. Hence, even disregarding the reverse causality problem, this is not a major cause of the change. (H3) Benefits of accompanying measures. Public transport satisfaction did in fact increase with the extended bus services, but according to the analysis in 5.3, the effect on the congestion pricing attitude is minute. Reverse causality is an issue here as well. (H4) Changes in related attitudes. These are the only measured variables that can explain the change in congestion pricing attitude to any substantial extent. As shown in 4.3, attitudes changed in a direction that tended to increase the support for the charges. The analysis in 5.3 indicated that this could explain around a quarter of the total change in congestion pricing attitudes. Still, this should be interpreted with caution: at least part of the changes in related attitudes are likely due to a general increase in support for the red/green political parties, rather than directly caused by the introduction of the congestion charges. (H5) Reframing. The parameters for the attitude factors in the models estimated in 5.2 measure the strength of the association between support for congestion charges and, for example, environmental concerns. Hence, the parameters can be seen as an indication of how the charges are perceived: if the charges are perceived as an environmental measure, for example, the association between environmental concerns and support for the charges will be strong. If reframing contributed to the change, the parameters measuring the influence of the attitude factors on the congestion pricing attitude would have changed between the years. For example, if the charges become perceived less as a tax, then the association between opinions about taxes and opinions about the charges should be weakened. As the statistical tests in 5.2 showed, these associations (the model parameters) do not change. We can hence conclude that there is no evidence of reframing, since the links between the congestion pricing attitude and the various other attitudes are (statistically) identical in the two years. (H6) Loss aversion. Loss aversion means that something is valued higher once you have it. In our case, this would mean that the loss of tolls paid would hurt less and time savings be valued higher after the change than before. As shown in the tests in 5.2, the parameters for tolls paid and value of time are unchanged between the years. We can hence conclude that loss aversion, in this sense, does not appear to play a role for the attitude change. (H7) Status quo bias. Once all measurable variables are controlled for, and any changes in their influence accounted for, the remaining change in attitudes can be attributed to status quo bias. This shows up in our models as year-specific constants. These constants are simply the "inexplicable" change in attitudes, the change which cannot be attributed to any measured variable, or any change in the influence of these variables; such "inexplicable" change is what is generally defined as status quo bias. Naturally, it is always impossible to conclusively rule out the possibility that some unmeasured variable caused the change. In this sense, pure status quo bias can never be proved outside certain laboratory settings, only inferred once all variables the researcher can think of are controlled for. In our case, interpreting the year-specific constants as a sign of status quo bias is especially natural since the constants do not vary with travel patterns, toll payments, socioeconomic characteristics (except gender) or attitudes.
Status quo bias can be caused by cognitive dissonance, i.e. accepting unavoidable or irreversible changes (as shown in a nice experiment by Schade and Baum (2007) ). However, this seems to be unlikely in this case, since the political debate about the charges and the associated infrastructure package was extremely lively at the time of the surveys. The impression was certainly not that the outcome was inevitable; in fact, a referendum about the charges is scheduled for the autumn of 2014, a year after our second survey.
CONCLUSIONS
Virtually all cities that have introduced congestion charges have seen public opinion become more positive after the introduction. Gothenburg is the latest example in this series. We find that the share of respondents who would "definitely" or "likely" vote yes in a referendum about the charges and the associated infrastructure package funded by the revenues increased from 33% right before the introduction to 50% a year later (excluding "don't know" responses). The share of positive respondents stating that they "definitely" would vote yes increased from a third to almost a half.
Several explanations of this phenomenon have been put forward in previous literature. The explanations are not mutually exclusive; they may all contribute to some extent to the change in attitudes. Using surveys before and after the introduction, we have tested how much the various explanations contribute to the change.
The most commonly proposed explanation is that positive effects turn out to be larger than expected. Our results do not support this at all in Gothenburg; in fact, beliefs in positive effects actually decreased after the introduction. Beliefs in negative effects also decreased, on the other hand; the perception that things did not turn out as bad as expected may have contributed somewhat to the more positive attitudes. If we ignore reverse causality (that more positive attitudes may reduce beliefs in negative effects, rather than the other way around), decreased beliefs can have contributed with up to 9% of the total change in attitudes. Since there almost certainly is some degree of reverse causality, the real number is most likely lower than this.
Several improvements in the public transport system were made shortly before the introduction of the charges. They were partly funded by the revenues from the charges, and were marketed as a part of the general charge/infrastructure package. This hypothecation of charge revenues may have increased support for the charges. However, our analyses suggest that this contribution is almost negligible at 2%.
The process of introducing congestion charges and the associated debate and political campaigns may change related attitudes, for examples regarding equity, environment or towards pricing policies in general. For example, it has been suggested that a contributing factor to the increased support for the Stockholm charges was an increased acceptance of pricing as a method for allocating scarce resources and regulating externalities. Our results lend some support to this; changes in related issues contribute with around 11% of the total change in attitude towards the charges. However, this change in related attitudes is not necessary caused by the introduction of the charges -it might simply be a part of longer trend in favour of the left/green political block, and this just happens to work in favour of the charges.
There may also be changes in what other attitudes influence the attitude towards the charges. A political debate or campaign charges can cause a reframing of the congestion charges, where the charges can be reinterpreted or "re-branded" from, say, a fiscal measure to an environmental measure. In the longer perspective, this is most likely an important mechanism, but there is no evidence of this in our results, which only encompass one year. All variables, including attitude factors, seem to influence the attitude towards the charges in exactly the same way before and after the introduction.
The final explanation is status quo bias, and this seems to be by far the most important mechanism, contributing with three quarters of the total change in attitudes. Interestingly, the change is stronger among women. The status quo bias does not seem to be caused by loss aversion; if it was, we would for example have seen a smaller attitude change among respondents who pay little or nothing compared to those how pay a lot. Instead, we see a similar change in attitudes across almost all groups, be it car drivers, environmentalists or public transport users, irrespective of self-interest and general attitudes -the only distinction is that the effect is slightly stronger among men in two-car households. Hence, the status quo bias seems to be a general phenomenon: the change is resisted partly just because it is a change, and once the policy is there, the support increases partly just because "it's there". The existence of status quo bias poses a philosophical problem for democracies and welfare evaluation. If a population would vote against a policy before it is introduced, but would vote in favor of keeping it once it has been introduced, and the only reason for the change in attitudes is status quo biasis it then democratically defensible to introduce the policy? One way to come to grips with this question is to say that it has to do with the characteristic of the policy: if it in some way means that resources are spent more efficiently, and if reasonable measures of public welfare increase, then one is tempted to answer yes. But this is far from an obvious answer; the question goes well beyond the scope of this paper.
We can only speculate regarding whether our results are applicable to other cities as well. Clearly, the visible congestion reductions in London and Stockholm were both larger and less expected, so the "larger effects than expected" may be a bigger factor in those cities than in Gothenburg. However, Eliasson (2014) shows that this can only explain a minor part of the attitude change in Stockholm. As to the Norwegian systems, there were very little traffic effects to speak of, and the benefits of revenue spending were not visible until well after the change in public attitudes were already visible. It is clear that the framing of congestion pricing -for example, whether it is presented as a fiscal, environmental or traffic-technical measure -plays a substantial role for public acceptability (Eliasson & Jonsson, 2011; Hamilton & Eliasson, 2012; Schade & Schlag, 2003) . In the longer run, how congestion pricing is framed is most likely a decisive factor. However, reframing seems to be a too slow process to affect attitudes to congestion pricing in the short run studied here, and hence it seems unlikely that this is the main driving factor behind the considerable attitude change before/after introduction that many cities have experienced. Given this, we are inclined to believe that status quo bias has played a major role for the change in public attitudes to congestion pricing in other cities as well.
